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Monetarism is hard to define because it is not the doctrine of a school that is sharply 
differentiated from the rival Keynesian and new classical  schools. While some 
ecconomists are clearly monetarists, others take intermediate positions that make it 
more or less arbitrary whether to call them monetarists. The basic theoretical 
propositions of monetarism, that changes in the quantity of money (defined as currency 
plus at least checkable deposits) play the central role in the determination of nominal 
income. differs only in degree from the view held by most Keynesians that changes in 
th~e  quantity of money are a major (and in the long run the dominant) determinant of 
changes in nominal income. There is little disagreement between Keynesians, 
m~onetarists  and new clac+A  economists about long run equilibrium. But while new 
classical economists think that this equilibrium is reached rapidly, and Keynesians think 
it  is reached  slowly, monetarists take an intermediate position. That  is an important 
difference because  many policy questions relate to this intermediate run. 
To be sure, much of the monetarist research strategy focuses on changes in the 
sdpply of and demand for money, while the Keynesian strategy is to look also at the 
propensity to consume, the marginal efficiency of investment, government expenditures 
and net exports. But this difference relates only to the way of proceeding with research, 
and not directly to how the economy functions. 
There is greater disagreement on policy. Some monetarists agree with 
K~ynesians,  that -  in principle -  fiscal policy can have a significant effect on nominal 
income, but deny that in practice it has a large effect. Others deny that even in principle 
fiscal policy has a significant effect on income.  While hard-core monetarists believe 
that the money supply should grow at a fixed rate, other merely want the growth rate of 
money to be stable, a position not so different from that of some Keynesians who 
oppose %ne-tuning". 
There are several major sources of monetarism. One is the work of MiRon 
Friedman (1  912-) (see Friedrnan, 1956, l969), a leader of the Chicago school, and 
Anna Schwartz (1915-). The other is the work of Karl Brunner (1916-89) and Allan 
Meker  (1  928 -).(See Bwnner and Mettzer, 1989; 1993) Brunner and  Meltzer's work 
temds to focus somewhat more on theoretical issues than does Friedman's. For a time work done at the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis showing the dominance of 
monetary policy over fiscal policy also did much to buttress the monetarist case. Other 
important monetarists are in the US.  Michael Darby (1945-), Phillip Cagan (1927-), 
Robert Hetzel(1944-), William (Poole, 1937-), Robert Rasche (1  941-) and Clark 
Warburton (1  896-1  979) (who had anticipated much of Friedman's work; in Canada 
David Laidler (1  938-); in Germany Manfred Neumann  (1  933-) and in Israel Alex 
Cukierrnan, (1  938-).  In the United Kingdom Alan Walters (1  926-) is probably the best 
known. 
Summary of Basic Ideas and History of Monetarism 
The term monetarism was coined in 1968 by Karl Brunner, but the core idea of 
monetarism, the quantity theory of money,  is much older. This theory, which asserts 
tlhat changes in the supply of money are the dominant determinant of changes in 
niominal income or prices, can be found as far back as antiquity. David Hume (171  1-76) 
presented a remarkably sophisticated version of this theory and also upheld many other 
nionetarist views. 
Early in this century Irving Fisher's (1867-1  947) The Purchasing Power of 
Alloney (191  1)  was a landmark in the development of the quantity theory and in its 
empirical testing. Fisher used what is called the transactions version of the equafion of 
exchange, MV  =PT, where M is the money supply, V its velocity, that is the number of 
times the average unit of money is spent per period (say a year), T the total volume of 
transactions undertaken with money, and P the average price of the items exchanged 
in these transactions. These transactions encompass not only final output, i.e., real 
GDP, but also transactions in intermediate goods (such as the iron ore that is used to 
make steel), factor payments and purchases of financial assets. An alternative version, 
called the income version, defines V as the number of time a unit of money becomes 
income during the period, T as real GDP arid P as the average price of items included 
in GDP. 
The equation of exchange should not be confused with the quantity theory. It 
does not tell us whether most of the change in P is due to changes in M or V or in T, or 
whether causation runs from money to prices, prices to money or velocity to prices, etc. 
To establish the quantity theory requires two empirical suppositions, which Fisher 
tested at length. One is that since the velocity of money depends on customs and slow- 
changing institutions it is stable after adjusting for a secular trend. In particular, changes in the quantity of money do not produce largeiy offsetting changes in velocity. 
The other supposition is that changes in the money supply are the cause, and chanqes 
in prices the effect; for example that new gold discoveries raise the money supply, 
which then raises real income and prices. On the other hand, suppose that prices rise 
because of  greater union pressures for wage increases, and that the central bank 
responds to the resulting rise in the demand for nominal money by increasing the 
rnoney supply. The observed correlation between prices and the money supply would 
then not be evidence supporting the quantity theory because causation runs in the 
wrong direction. 
While Fisher developed his version of the quantity theory Arthur C. Pigou (1  877- 
1' 959) at Cambridge University developed further Alfred Marshall's (1  842-1  924) 
"Cambridge" version. It states the equation as M=KPT, where M, P and T have the 
same meanings as before, and K (the reciprocal of V in the income version of Fisher's 
equation) is the proportion of their incomes that people keep as cash balances. This 
version has the advantage of relating people's behavior with respect to money holdings 
~~xpiicitly  to their decisions, and hence to the optimizing behavior, that forms the basis 
of economic theory. 
Modem quantity theorists therefore generally use the Cambridge formulation 
r(ather  than Fischer's formulation. They also use the income version, in part because 
tlhey are more concerned with the behavior of GDP and the prices of those goods that 
are included in GDP than with the volume of total transactions and its prices. Moreover, 
while GDP data are readily available data on total transactions are not. 
In continental Europe the quantity theory was discussed by Albert Aftalion 
(1  974-1  956), Maffeo Pantaleoni (1  857-1  924), Leon Walras (1  834-1  91  0) and  Knut 
bMcksel1 (1  851-1  926). 
In the early part of this century many economists in  Britain and the U.S. were 
quantity theorists. That changed drastically in the 1930s. During the depression velocity 
in the U.S. and in Britain fell  sharply, a development  that at the time appeared to 
invalidate the quantity theory with its assumption of a stable velocity. And the fact that 
seemingly low interest rates failed to stimulate the economy suggested at the time that 
rnonetary factors were not an important determinant of income. What was perhaps 
even more important was the publication in 1936 of The General Theory of 
Employment, lnterest and Money, in which Keynes (1  883-1  946) brilliantly presented an ailternative approach to income determination based on an analysis of the incentives to 
spend on consumption and investment. it soon swept the field, and at least in the U.S. 
a~nd  in Great Britain the quantity theory was considered an exploded fallacy. The 
General Theory, along with the depression also initiated a shift in economist's attention 
frfom  long-run trends to short-run developments,  and from changes in prices to 
changes in output and unemployment. Moreover, with expenditures now seen as 
governed primarily by income rather than by money holdings, monetary policy was 
considered weak, and fiscal policy, which directly changes income, was considered 
strong. 
That situation changed in the 1950s for several reasons. First, quite 
unexpectedly it turned out that inflation, and not  massive unemployment, was the 
major postwar economic problem. This is a problem on which the quantity theory has a 
comparative advantage. Second, it was intuitively appealing to relate the ongoing 
inflations to the expansionary monetary policies being followed, thus supporting the 
quantity theory. 
Third, Milton Friedman reformulated the quantity theory in a way that appealed 
to modern economists, shifting the focus of attention from the long-run where it had 
been in Fisher's work -- Fisher did not apply the quantity theory to the short run -- to 
encompass the short run as well as the long run. This was important because concern 
about business cycles and unemployment  had shifted economists' attention to the 
short run. In that connection he also shifted the emphasis from explaining the price 
level (a  variable that is more responsive in the long run) to explaining nominal income. 
This meant that the quantity theory could now explain changes in output as well as in 
prices, and could no longer be dismissed  as arbitrarily assuming full employment. 
Moreover, instead of treating velocity as more or less exogenously given, Friedman 
explained it along the lines of standard portfolio theory, making it a function of income 
(or wealth) and the interest rate. In this he followed  Keynes, though he rejected 
Keynes' idea that the demand for money, and hence velocity, is highly interest elastic 
and unstable. 
Indeed, Don Patinkin (1922-1995) (in Gordon, 1974) has strongly argued that 
Friedman's quantity theory is a further development of Keynesian theory, and not of the 
traditional quantity theory. Friedman (in Gordon, 1974) strongly disagrees. A 
reasonable solution to this dispute is to say that Friedman uses some of Keynes' theoretical tools to reach traditional quantity-theory results. Whether one calls it a 
Keynesian or quantity theory therefore depends, in part, on whether one classifies 
theories by their tools or by their conclusions. But even in the former case Friedman 
differs from Keynes in an important way. He, unlike Keynes, determines aggregate 
expendit~i~;,  indirectly, -,  .mking  at what is no. spent, that is at money holdings. 
Friedman's success in restoring the quantity theory to a position where, though 
it was not accepted by the majority of economists, it was at least a serious competitor, 
was aided by several factors in addition to Friedman's brilliance. One was that the then 
prevailing version of Keynesian theory had gone much too far in de-emphasizing the 
role of changes in the quantity of money, which made it an easy target for monetarist 
criticism. Second, in part under the influence of other writings of Friedman, a 
methodological shift had occurred in economics. There was now less emphasis on 
apparently plausible reasoning and more on empirical evidence. Keynesian theory had 
benefited from the previous emphasis on common-sense plausibility because it seems 
much more plausible that our expenditures are determined by our incomes than by the 
amount of money we happen to hold. So when Friedman and his students, as well as 
other monetarists, pointed to empirical evidence showing a close correlation between 
money and nominal income, that is to a stable Cambridge K, economists took notice. 
Thus someone reading Friedman's theoretical essay on the quantity theory might be 
skeptical about what the theory could accomplish. But that skepticism would be 
reduced by reading the essays by Friedman's students, which successfully applied the 
theory to specific cases, such as hyperinflation, and velocity in the United States. 
At the same time Don Patinkin (1956, 1965) reformulated the traditional quantity 
theory in a much more abstract way that provided elegance and rigor, and thus brought 
the quantity theory into line with recent advances in economic theory.  And in the 1970s 
Brunner and Meltzer developed a monetarist model of  income determination that 
challenged Keynesian theory  in fundamental ways,  though it never attained the 
prominence of either Friedman's  or Patinkin's  version of the quantity theory. 
As a result, during the 1960s and 1970s a substantial part of the work in 
monetary theory dealt with the quantity theory. Much of it consisted of trying to explain 
the determinants of the demand for money, as well as of debates about the stabilrty of 
velocity, and the interest elasticity of the demand for money. (The interest elasticity of 
the demand for money is the percentage change in the demand for money per 1 percent change in the rate of interest.) Indeed, Friedman  had labeied the quantity 
theory a theory of the demand for money, because once one has pinned down the 
demand for money, and knows the (exogenously given) supply of money, one can 
determine the levels of nominal income and interest rates needed to equilibrate the 
supply at-~d  demand fob  ,  ,  ,,ney. 
In the 1980s  the monetarist theory of income determination lost much support. 
One reason was that the demand for money and velocity became much less stable, so 
that the quantity theory no longer provided such a useful tool for predicting nominal 
income. Another reason is that starting in the late 1970s economists became interested 
in a rival theory, new classical theory. The technical challenge of employing the 
complex models of new classical theory, combined with a renewed emphasis on formal 
theory, attracted many younger economists, who otherwise might have become 
monetarists. 
The other main doctrine of monetarism, that central banks should let the money 
supply grow at a stable rate, has much less of a history. Under the gold standard 
central banks were not supposed to control the money supply for domestic objectives. 
Hence the question whether it is better to let money grow at a stable rate than to 
undertake countercyclical policies did not become salient until the 1930s when the  gold 
standard collapsed. At that point probably most economists  believed that central banks 
should now focus on countercydical policies. But in 1936  Henry Simons (1  899-1  946) 
challenged this view and advocated stable money growth, a position which Friedman 
th~en  developed much further and buttressed by empirical evidence of wrong-headed 
central bank policies. 
The Monetarist Theory of  Income of  Nominal lncome Determination 
Everyone agrees that since nominal income is equal to aggregate expenditures, to 
know nominal income one must know nominal expenditures. But monetarists, unlike 
Keynesians, explain aggregate expenditures indirectly. Suppose that everyone spends 
hi~s  or her entire receipts. In each period aggregate expenditures would then be equal 
to the receipts -  and hence the expenditures and income -  of the previous period. But 
if people try to add to their money holdings or to reduce them, or if additional money is 
injected into the economy or withdrawn from it, then expenditures will change. Hence, 
one can explain changes in nominal income by looking at changes in the supply of money and in the demand for money. This is the research strategy of the quantity 
theory. 
This research strategy differs from the Keynesian strategy in several ways. First 
it focuses on equilibrium in a single market, the market for money. It can do so, since 
any receipts that are not Aded  Yo  money holdings ---  went on goods and securities, 
slo that the market for goods and securities is in equilibrium if, and only if, the market for 
money is in equilibrium. Such an indirect approach to determining aggregate 
expenditures has the advantage that analyzing the markets for money is easier than 
analyzing the market for the various types of expenditures and their interactions. 
Hence, while Keynesians often use large econometric models to trace the effects of 
changes in the quantity of money on income, many monetarists avoid such elaborate 
treatment of the transmission process from money to income, and simply say that if the 
supply of money rises the public will spend more. They do this, in part, because they 
blelieve that capital markets are tluid, so that if, say firms decide to invest less, the 
funds not used for business investment will readily find their way to other spenders, 
sxh  as households that want to purchase houses. 
Moreover, because they (30  not estimate GDP by adding demands in various 
sectors, monetarists make a sharp distinction between macroeconomic and 
rr~icroeconomic  phenomena. Assume, for example, that investment opportunities in the 
t~ucking  industry increase, so that trucking firms invest more. Keynesians recognize 
that one should not simply add this additional investment to the previous estimate of 
investment because, by raising interest rates, it will reduce other investment. But they 
treat this as an indirect effect, and are tempted to treat such indirect effects as 
secondary. Monetarists, on the other hand, argue that except insofar as the demand for 
more trucks, by raising interest rates, lowers the Cambridge k or induces the central 
bank to increase supply of money, it will not change GDP. 
This difference between (giving  a certain effect a direct or an indirect role may 
seem subtle, and one that should play no role in a comprehensive analysis that takes 
indirect effects, as well direct effects into account. However, much economic analysis is 
not oomprehensive. Suppose, for example, that a Keynesian economist and a 
monetarist economist were asked to estimate the effect on the general price level of a 
10 percent rise in steel prices. The Keynes~an  would be tempted to argue as follows: 
Since steel accounts for x percent of the value of total output, as a first approximation the price level will rise by 0.1~  percent. By contrast, the monetarist would be tempted to 
siay that since the money supply is constant,  as a first  approximation only the relative 
price of steel will rise, while the price level will remain constant. Both would have to 
concede that their analyses are rnot complete, but incomplete analysis does, of 
necessity infuse much of our thinking and form;  the background that often shapes our 
more elaborate analyses. 
Another difference in research strategy is that while Keynesians formulate their 
analysis in terms of changes in the interest rate, monetarists do so in terms of changes 
in the supply of or demand for money. To a considerable extent that is just a matter of 
wording. Given the demand curve for money, that is the quantity of money demanded 
at  each interest rate, one can express any point on the curve equally well by reference 
to either the Y axis (the interest rate) or the X axis (the money supply.) Monetarists 
argue that it is better to think in terms of the money supply, because the most relevant 
measure of the interest rate, the expected real rate of interest, is hard to estimate.  This 
is so because price expectations cannot be measured accurately, and also because it 
is difticuk to combine the numerous interest rates that exist (some of which are not 
even recorded by our data) into ,a single measure. Monetarists therefore focus on the 
money supply instead of the interest rate, not because they somehow think that money 
can affect income in some mysterious way independently of what is happening to the 
y~~elds  on various assets, but because of practical problems of measurement. 
Keynesians respond that, for reasons discussed below  it is even more difficult to 
measure the quantity of money. Moreover, the interest rate provides more information 
about what will happen to income than does the quantity of money because it combines 
the effect of changes both in the! supply of money and the demand for money. 
Measuring the Money Supply 
hillonetarists are right  when they say that  since the price level is the  exchange rate 
between money and goods, an increase in the  money  supply, cateris paribus, raises 
prices. But to go from this insight to a  theory that can be used for (and tested by) 
predictions requires that money be defined in a way  that can be measured with 
sufficient accuracy. This has proved a major problem for monetarism.  There are three 
main alternative definitions of  money.  Narrow money, MI,  consists of currency and 
checkable deposits. A broader definition, M2 adds certain other highly liquid assets to 
MI  while M3  adds still other liquid assets. The exact definitions of M2  and M3  vary among countries . In the U.S.,  for example, &  includes time deposits of $100,000 or 
less, overnight  repurchase agreements and shares  in certain mutual money market 
funds  and overnight Eurodollar holdings,  while Mg  adds those time deposits, 
repurchase agreements and Eurodollar holdings and mutual money market  shares that 
a~re  exclu.ki from  MZ.  :.  ..,e United Kingdom, u  related concept,  known as M4 adds 
to EM3 building society deposits. (f  M3  consists of all bank deposits  denominated in 
sterling and held by U.K.  residents.  Even broader definitions of money than M3  have 
been proposed. Another concept that is used, though it is not strictly speaking 
"money", is  Mo,  called the monetary base, which consists of currency and bank 
reserves. 
Suppose that M,  is falling at a 1 percent rate, MI and & are  rising at a 1 
percent rate and 3 percent rate respectively, while  Mj is constant. Does the quantity 
theory predict that nominal incorne will  rise, fall, or remain constant? A standard way of 
dealing with this problem is to use the measure of money that  has the  best correlation 
with income. But this procedure has several weaknesses.  First, the answer may vary 
from time to time, and  may change in unexpected ways. For example, in the U.S. MI 
had at least as good a correlation with income as M2 did until the  1980s, but a much 
worse correlation afterwards. Second, a high correlation between a particular measure 
of money and income may resuht, not from money causing income, but from income 
causing money (the problem of "reverse causation" discussed below), ur from a third 
variable affecting both money and income. Third, if  the quantity theory is to be used as 
a guilde to monetary policy it should employ a measure of money that the central bank 
can cmtrol with sufficient accuracy. If quantity theorists demonstrate that a certain 
broad measure of money has a close relation to income, this is only of limited use to a 
central bank that can exercise reliable control only over a narrow measure. 
A basic problem is that people drive returns on financial assets including 
deposits to a rate that yields the same expected utility.  This proposition is not so 
important in a world of bank and intermediary regulation,  in which legal ceilings limit 
deposit-rate competition, and other regulations limit the type of  deposits and securities 
that can be provided. Such conditions have  been typical for many periods of history, 
including especially the  postwar period. But most recently deregulation has been 
spreading to finance  and the demand for monetary instruments has adjusted to changes in newly freed deposit rates. There is now intense competition and substitution 
between "wide" money and other assets. 
An additional problem is  that residents of  one country can hold some of the~r 
money balances in another country's currency.  Suppose that the Lira holdings of 
Italian residents are constant, but  that they now hold  more Eurodollars or sterling 
balances. Their ability to purchase Italian goods has gone up just about as much as if 
they had held these deposits in Lira. But their  Eurodollars and holdings of sterling do 
not show up as a change in the Italian money supply.  It is not just large corporations 
that hold foreign monies,  households do it too by holding currency notes.  Since 
currency notes held outside a country have no effect on its income, they should be 
excluded from the country's money supply.  But the necessary data are not available. 
Such foreign currency holdings are not trivial. Perhaps three quarters of U.S. currency ( 
and hence almost a quarter of  MI ) is held abroad.  There are also foreign holdings of 
deutschemark and other currencies. 
Moreover,  at least in the U.S.  the lnitally available money supply data that are 
used to make policy are subject to substantial subsequent revision. All in all, the 
difficulty of empirically defining and measuring money is one of the greatest 
weaknesses of monetarism. 
The Demand For Money and the Effect of Changes in the Money Supply 
Although in their other work leading quantity theorists have also made substantial 
contributions to explaining what determines the supply of money, for the quantity theory 
itself they take the money supply as exogenously determined. Hence, it is the 
determinants of the demand for money that quantity theorists have to investigate. They 
take the demand for money holdings in nominal terms as depending, like the demand 
for any other good, primarily on the relative price (which in the case of money is the 
interest rate), on nominal income or wealth and on "tastes", a variable that includes the 
prevailing payments technology (such as the use of GIRO accounts) in addition to the 
public's preferences. On the assumption that these tastes are stable there is then a 
stable function relating the demand for money to interest rates and nominal income. 
Suppose, for example, that the supply of money increases by 10 percent. 
Equilibrium in the market for money then requires that the demand for money also rise by 10 percent. This, in turn, requires a palticular combination of a decline in interest 
rates and a rise in nominal income. Suppose for the moment  that interest rates are 
canstant. If so, nominal income will have to rise by enough to make the public demand 
I0 percent more nominal money. Supposls further, that real income and real wealth are 
also constant, so that only prices rise.  With real income  and interest rates constant 
rational behavior ceteris paribus implies that the real quantity of money that the public 
wants to hold is  constant. And to keep the real quantity of money constant prices have 
to rise in proportion to the increase in the money supply, that is by 10 percent in this 
example. Only then will the money supply be equal to the amount of money that the 
public wants to hold. One can therefore say that: (a) the government and the banking 
system determine the quantity of nominal money in existence, (b) the public determines 
the real quantrty of money it wants to hold, and (c) the price level adjusts to make the 
nominal quantity of money supplied correspond to the real quantity that the public 
wants to hold. 
But how can quantity theorists assume that the interest rate is constant? Surely, 
an increase in the quantity of money lowers interest rates as holders of the additional 
money offer it on the loan market. There are two possible answers. An old-fashioned 
one is to assume that the demand for money responds only very little, if at all to 
changes in interest rates, so that even when interest rates change substantially, the 
demand for money is affected very little, and it is therefore changes in nominal income 
that have to do nearly all the work to equilibrate the demand and supply of money. This 
explanation has not survived ernpirical test. 
A  much better explanation is to look beyond the first-round effect of an increase 
in the money supply. Assume, just for ease of exposition, that prices and real income 
were stable before the money supply increased. At first the interest rate declines, so 
that expenditures, real income and prices all rise. As a result, the demand for money 
increases and this drives up the interest rate again. And it has to continue to rise until it 
is back at its previous level. Sirrce we started out from an equilibrium level of the 
interest rate at which prices and real income were stable, as long as the interest rate is 
belaw that level expenditures are higher than before. That continues to drive up the real 
incame and prices, and hence the interest rate. If one assumes that the economy was 
operating at full employment at the time the money supply increased, then all of the rise 
in nominal income that occurred must represent a  rise in the price level. Since, with interest rates back at their previous level, the public wants to hold the same quantity of 
real money as before, to equate the supply and demand for money. the price level must 
then have risen in proportion to the increase! in the nominal money supply. 
What is critical here is how long it takes the interest rate to return to its previous 
level.  Most economists wuld  agree that the quunt"  "vory is correct in the sense that 
an increase in the quantity of money will evtantually lead to a proportional rise in prices. 
Keynes did not deny that. What is subject to dispute is how long it takes for this to 
occur. If it takes, say twenty years, then it is not a very interesting proposition since 
policymakers  and others who want to forecast econcmic conditions usually have a 
much shorter horizon, usually less than five years. Hence, to a considerable extent one 
can treat the dispute between quantity theo~~ists  and Keynesians as a dispute about 
how long it takes for prices to adjust fully to changes in the money supply. That is an 
empirical issue. 
Other Aspects  of the Quantity Theory 
Keynesians explain changes in nominal income. not only by changes in the money 
supply that change interest rates, but also by changes in the propensity to consume, 
the incentives to invest, government expenditures and net exports.  In the quantity 
theory these four variables also affect nominal income, but they do so indirectly. If 
households want to consume more, or firms  want to invest more, or if the government 
borrows to increase its expenditures, then the interest rate rises. Wrth the opportunity 
cost of holding money thus having increased, the public has an incentive to hold less 
monely per Lira of income, so that that the Cambridge k falls and hence nominal income 
rises. 
This does not mean, however, that the quantity theory and Keynesian theory 
are the same, only that one can state the p-opositions of one theory in the language of 
the other. The two theories do not differ in rejecting each other's logical chains, but on 
the empirical suppositions that determine what conclusions the logical chains generate. 
Suppose, for example, that the interest elasticity of the demand for money is low, while 
the interest elasticity of investment is high. Then, if the incentives to invest increase, 
the demand for funds to invest drives up the interest rate substantially since it takes a 
big  rise in interest rates to induce the public to hold significantly less money relative to 
its income. This rise in interest rates then limits substantially the rise in investment, and 
hence income does not increase much. Similarly, under these conditions, if the government deficit increases norninal incorne is little changed. The quantity theory's 
prediction that if the money supply is constiant nominal income does not change much 
is then valid. By contrast, if the interest elasticity of demand for money is high and the 
interest elasticity of investment is low, then a rise in government  expenditures financed 
by borrowirl:  is not off.cc4  '  * muc:h  of a decline i?  investment. 
As discussed below,  the quantity tt-  eory and Keynesian theory also differ in 
their interpretation of history. In Keynesian thinking the incentives to invest (Keynes' 
"marginal productiviiy  of capital
n) is  unstable and is a major factor driving fluctuations 
in income. In quantity-theory thinking the marginal productivity of capital and other 
expenditure incentives are fairly stable (or changes in them are mutually offsetting), so 
that most of the  fluctuations in income that have occurred are due to changes in the 
money supply. Moreover, in Keynesian thinking an increase in the money supply, when 
it does occur, has for a long time a substantial part of its effect on interest rates rather 
than on expenditures and income. In quantity-theory thinking it fairly soon has all of its 
effect on prices. It might seem that these are empirical issues that are easy to resolve; 
one could, for example, compare past changes in the money supply with past changes 
in the incentives to invest. But the incentives to invest are hard to measure. 
Quantity theorists are frequently criticized for not having a genuine theory, and 
for relying on the mere correlatio~n  of changes in money and income, and thus 
committing the fallacy of post hoc ergo propter hoc. However,  they  can respond that 
they are relying on standard economic theclw which tells us that if the supply of an item 
increases, its relative price falls, so that an increase in the supply of money lowers the 
price of money in terms of goods, that is, it raises prices. While it would certainly be 
useful to have the steps leading from money to income spelled out in detail, rather than 
left vague and general, they believe that that this is not a necessary requirement for a 
coherent theory. 
In part the dispute about whether monetarists really have a theory is 
methodological and relates to the criteria for a good theory. A scientific theory should 
connect a wide set of empirical observatior~s  to theories we already hold, and should 
allow us to predict other observations. Mor etarists focus on prediction and on a 
theo~y's  ability to encompass a wide variety of observations. Some anti-monetarists 
focus on the rigor and detail with which the, observations are linked to standard 
microeconomic theory. For example, a leading anti-monetarist, Frank Hahn (1925-) charges that Friedman does not lhave a theory of money, because he does not explain 
why people hold money at all. But from Fri~ldman's  point of view what matters is not 
some deep explanation of why money is held, but an explanation of how much mondy 
the public wants to hold, so that one can predict changes in nominal income from 
changes in the money supply and from changes in factors, such as income, that 
determine how much money people want to hold. 
If the quantity theory e~pl~ains  the price level in a particular country it should also 
be able to explain the world price, level.  Indeed, under firmly fixed exchange rates the 
quantity theory should be used to explain only the world price level, since for any single 
country the  money supply is endlogenous.  Suppose, for example, that  income, and 
hence interest rates rise in country  A.  This induces an inflow of capital. To prevent the 
exchange rate from appreciating A's central bank then has to buy the resulting excess 
supply of  foreign exchange, that is, it has to increase its own money supply. Causation 
now runs from a rise in income to a rise in the rnoney supply. 
Monetarist models have been developed which assume that the "law of one 
price
n equalizes prices in all cour~tries  -- an assumption that is much stronger than 
appears at first glance, They shclw that in the long run exchange rate policy is  useless: 
in changing a country's  balance of payments "competitiveness":  depreciation results in 
a higher price level, but not in a higher level of exports and employment. 
International monetarism interprets movements of the exchange rate as 
indicating an excess supply of or demand for money in a country. If the residents of a 
country want to hold more money they  im~lort  it by  increasing their net sales of goods 
and securities to foreigners.  Under fixed e~change  rates this results in the central bank 
increasing the money supply as it buys up the resulting increase the supply of foreign 
currency. Under flexible rates the currency appreciates, which by reducing import prices 
and hence the price level, increases the real stock of domestic money. 
The Brunnel-Meltzer Model 
The quantity theory  standing alone is not 1 he only theoretical framework used by 
monetarists. Brunner and Meltzer have provided a more elaborate framework that 
investigates the transmission process from money to income and prices in much detail. 
They reject Keynesian theory mainly because it uses an underdeveloped model of the 
market for assets that does not distinguish1 between the markets for capital and for 
bonds, and the markets for money and for credit. arbitrarily assumes that money and bonds are substitutes, and  makes insufficient allowance for the effect of changes  on 
expenditures of changes in the stock of wealth and the relative yields of assets. For 
example, in their formal analysis Brunner iand Meltzer treat a government deficit as 
having a potentially important longer-run effect on aggregate expenditures, because it 
raises the stock of government securities Ihat the public holds and hence its wealth. As 
the increased security holdings raise the public's consumption, as well as the 
investment of the now more liqu~id  firms, expenditures and thus income rise, which then 
raises tax revenues. Equilibrium is reached when tax revenues have risen enough and 
certain government expenditures, such as unemployment compensation payments, 
have fallen enough to eliminate the deficit  Until income has risen sufficiently to 
balance the budget the economy is not in equilibrium because the public's stock of 
government debt is increasing. 
Some economists have argued that this Brunner-Meltzer model is essentially a 
modified Keynesian model. Brunner and Meltzer, however, consider their just 
mentioned criticisms of Keynesian models as indicating a substantial difference. In 
addition, Brunner and Meltzer look at investment incentives (and the economy as a 
whole) in the absence of govern~ment  intervention as being  more stable than do 
Keynesians. Moreover, Brunner and Meltzer argue that the empirical evidence shows 
values for the critical parameters which suaport the traditional quantity-theory result that 
the observed changes in income are largely due to changes in the money supply. 
The Brunner-Meltzer moldel can be cited in reply to the frequent Keynesian 
charge that monetarists lack a genuine theory and rely on the mere correlation of 
changes in money and income. This does not mean, of course, that Brunner and 
Meltzer are able to establish the superioriiq of the monetarist explanation of economic 
events over the Keynesian explanation on theoretical grounds alone. Depending upon 
the values of certain parameters their moc el can yield Keynesian as well as monetarist 
results. Brunner and  Meltzer thlerefore de~oted  much effort to empirical work, that is to 
correlations. Thus they have ccmtributed notably to estimating demand functions for 
money. 
Fiscal Policy 
The disagreement about the effect of fiscal policy -- a central issue in the monetarist 
debate -- illustrates the monetarists' position. Monetarists, both those who use the 
quantity theory, and those who use the B~unner  and Meltzer model,  agree with Keynesians that -- in principle -- a rise in the deficit has an effect that raises nominal 
income. According to  the quantity-theory  t raises interest rates, and hence lowers the 
Cambridge k. In the Brunner-Meker model it raises aggregate demand and hence 
income directly in the short run als the government spends more or cuts taxes, and. in 
the longer run indirectly by raising wealth. 13ut what matters is what the empirical 
evidence shows, and that, say many monetarists, is that deficits have little effect on 
income. 
This ineffectiveness of fi~ical  policy does not need to be left as an unexplained 
and puzzling observation. First, if the interest elasticity of the demand for money is low 
relative to the interest elasticity of expenditures, a rise in the interest rate induced by a 
deficit does not lower the Cambridge k much and mainly crowds out other 
expenditures. Second, any decline in the Cambridge k that does result from lower 
interest rates could be offset by the public wanting to hold more money as the deficit 
increases its holdings of government securities. Third, there is the Ricardian 
equivalence theorem which (independently of monetarism) claims that the public 
responds to an increase in the deficit by saving more in the expectation that sooner or 
later taxes will have to be raised to pay the interest on the larger debt, or to repay some 
the debt. (Friedman, but not Brunner and hleltzer, gives some credence to this 
theory.)Hence, while the monetarist position that fiscal policy is ineffective is rooted in 
empirical findings, it is not necessarily incowistent with economic theory. 
The Statist cal Evidence 
A major part of the empirical evidence cited by monetarists is the high correlation 
between the nominal money supply and nominal income that has been amply 
documented for various countries, in particular the U.S. (Friedman and Schwartz, 1963 
and 1982), the United Kingdom (Friedman and Schwartz, 1982 and  Waiters, 1970) 
and Italy (Spinelli, 1996). This correlation exists not only for secular movements, but 
also for cyclical movements. Hence, monei.arists argue that business cycles, or at least 
major business cycles, are the result of an unstable growth rate of money. Comparison 
of the growth rates of money and inflation rates across countries also support the 
quantity theory. 
Keynesians have no trouble with the long-run correlation; such a finding is 
consistent with Keynssian theory, though Keynesians would stress the importance of 
not ignoring the short run. The correlation between cyclical movements in money growth and income is another matter. Keynesians do not deny that some business 
cycles have a monetary origin, but they treat a decline in the growth rate of money as 
just one of several factors that lcan accou ~t for business cycles. 
They have therefore challenged the monetarist interpretation of the short-run 
corrolatic,~~,  arguing t;,.  .. ..,ere is often "r~!vers~  causation", that is, causation running 
from changes in income to changes in the money supply. Such reverse causation could 
result from the behavior of the money multiplier, that is the relation between changes in 
the monetary base and the money supply  The money multiplier depends on the 
public's preference for currency relative to bank deposits, and on the ratio of reserves 
that banks hold against their deposits. Suppose that a sharp drop in profitability causes 
many firms to fail and raises fears that some banks will be dragged down. The public 
then withdraws deposits from banks. To prevent their reserve ratios from falling banks 
respond to this decline in their reserves by  reducing their loans and security holdings, 
so that their deposits and hence! the money supply fall. In addition, banks may tw  to 
protect themselves by holding a higher reserve ratio, which further reduces deposits 
and the money supply. Such behavior has played a  role in some business cycles, but 
is unlikely to account for much o~f  the observed correlation of money and income. 
However, reverse correlation can also result from the behavior of the central bank. 
Central banks often want to prevent large swings in interest rates. They therefore 
provide banks with more reserves when income, and hence the demand for loans and 
for money increase, and with fewer reserves when income, and with it the demand for 
loans and for money decrease. In principle, the observed correlation between the 
growth rates of monsy and incorne could therefore be due to income causing money, 
not money causing income. Whether that is the correct explanation of the observed 
correlation is an empirical issue. 
Friedman and Schwartz have dealt with the reverse causation problem in 
several ways. First, they tried to show that for all the major, i.e. severe, U.S. cycles 
causation could not have run primarily from income to money, because in each case 
the change in the money supply was due ti:,  some exogenous factor, such as a greater 
gold supply induced by an innovation in gc14d  refining, or a change in central bank 
policy. However, they admit that they can demonstrate this only for the major cycles, 
and not for the much more numerous smalller cycles. Here they rely on the argument 
that if something can be shown 'Lo  hold for major cycles, it is also likely to hold for the minor cycles, whose smaller amlplitude malkes it harder to observe what is goiny on. 
Second, if causation runs from income to rnoney one would expect the characteristics 
of the relation of money to income to depend upon the particular transmission 
mechanism, and hence on the type of morletary system. But the relation between 
money and income has not changed much  despite substantial changes in the 
monetary system, such as the abandonment of the gold standard. Third, cyclical turning 
points in money preceded business cycle turning points. Ail the same, Friedman  and 
Schwartz do not claim that causation runs entirely from money to income, only that the 
money to income chain is more important than the income to money chain. 
This claim has not gone unchallenged. The argument that one can generalize 
from the observation that in major cycles money is causal to money being causal also 
in minor cycles has not convinced everyon!%.  Perhaps most recessions result from 
Keynesian factors, such as a decline in the profitability of investment, and in some 
cycles a negative shock to the money supply then turns what would otherwise have 
been a normal recession into a rnajor recession. If so, one can hardly argue that 
because a monetary shock is a dominating factor in  major recessions it must also be 
one in minor recessions. Moreover, while there have been major changes in the 
monetary system, they need not necessarily have led to noticeable changes in the way 
in which income affects money. Iln addition as James Tobin (1  918-) and William 
Brainard (1935) have shown, one can construct models in which income causes 
money, and yet the turning points of money precedes the turning points of income. 
Some economists have explored the causality issue econometrically. 
Essentially, they first regress inciome in ont?  period on income in previous periods, and 
on money in the current and previous periods. Then they reverse the procedure and 
regress money in the current period on money in previous periods, and on income in 
the current and previous periods. If in the first regression money contributes little to 
explaining income, while in the second regression income contributes much to 
explaining money, they take this as evidence that income "causes* money. But the 
concept of causality used in these tests is :ontroversial,  and what is worse, the results 
obtained are sensitive to specific technique used, such as the particular set of 
additional  variables that are inclluded in the regressions.. 
All in all, the causality issue has proved extremely troublesome. It has 
sometimes led to a confusion between what did happen and what can happen. Monetarists are right in claiming that if the central ba~~k  is determined enough it can 
control the money supply. But for the question of interpreting the observed correlation 
of money and income what is relevant is what the central bank actually did, not what it 
has the power to do. 
Monetarists have also tried to show that there is a stable demand function for 
money. Suppose the money de~mand  function is: MD  = a + bY + ci, where M~  is the 
demand for money, Y nominal income, i tPle interest rate, and a, b, c are stable 
coefficients. Since the money market brings the supply and demand for money into 
equality, one can replace Md  by Ma,  and then solve for Y. If one takes the interest rate 
as constant or otherwise known (or else assumes that the coefficient c is small enough 
for the term ci to be ignored), thlen if one knows the change in the money supply, one 
can predict the change in nomin~al  income. This formulation avoids the causality issue 
because it makes no claim about why income changed. All that it claims is that if  the 
money supply changes, then inc:ome  will change correspondingly. 
Many economists have fitted variants of such money demand functions,  often 
containing additional variables, hoping to find one in which the coefficients are stable. 
Such a function would allow mornetarists to predict income. But it would not, on its own, 
validate the quantity theory, because this theory also requires either that the interest 
rate is stable, or that its coefficient (the interest elasticity in a logarithmic version of the 
above equation) is low. Otherwise, what could be changing income might be not a 
change in the money supply  but, say fiscal policy, operating through a change in the 
interest rate, and hence a change in the demand for money. This is the causality issue 
again. 
During the 1960s and early 1970s money demand functions, some of them for 
long spans of yearly data, some for short spans of quarterly data, gave good f~s  for 
many countries, though often not as good for other countries as for the United States. 
In particular, Friedman and Schi~artz  (198;2)  argued that the demand for money had 
been remarkably stable in the United Kingdom and the United States for over a 
hundred years. 
But starting in the mid-1!370s, the flit of money demand functions in the United 
States seriously deteriorated as financial innovations, induced by high interest rates 
and facilitated by the computer revolution, allowed the public to economize on its 
money holdings. Subsequently, institution:al changes that permitted the payment of interest on some types of checkable deposits and eliminated interest-rate ceilings on 
other deposits led to substantial, additional instability in the demand for money. 
At first this did not create a serious problem for monetarists in the United States 
because, though the demand function for rinoney no longer gave a good fd, velocity 
was growing at a stable 3 percent rate, so ilhat cne could still predict income accurately 
from a knowledge of the money supply. But in 1982 the velocity of the narrow money 
supply (currency plus checkable deposits) hecame highly unstable. This was probably 
due mainly to changes in institutions, such as the payment of interest on checkable 
deposits, so that the public now holds as Mi,  funds that it does not intend to spend 
soon.  fV&  still had a stable velocily for some time. But in the early 1990s its velocity 
also became unstable. 
Another line of empirical research ulas  initiated in 1960 by Milton Friedman and 
David Meiselman when they claimed that a regression of consumption on the money 
supply yields a much better fit  than a regression of consumption on more distinctively 
Keynesian variables. A debate ensued thai focused on technical issues, such as the 
appropriate time periods to be considered, and the problem of reverse causation. A 
subsequent variant of the Friedman-Meiselman procedure by two economists at the St. 
Louis Federal Reserve Bank, Lelonall Ander'sen (1  924-85) and Jerry Jordan (1  MI-) 
addressed the narrower question whether i~scai  policy or monetary policy had a 
stronger, more predictable and fi~ter  effect on income. It found that monetary policy 
did, with the effects of fiscal policy quickly disappearing. Though Andersen and Jordan 
avoided some of the problems that plagued the Friedman-Meiselman study. their work 
led to a long debate, much of it again dealing with reverse causation. When, in the 
early 1980s, the velocity of narrow money /became  unstable, the Andersen-Jordan 
equation was no longer able to predict income, and this debate died down. 
Economic History 
Monetarists do not share the Keynesian belief that in the absence of stabilization policy 
a capitalist economy is highly unstable. That does not mean that they attribute all 
fluctuations to bad monetary policy, but only that they think that if the growth rate of 
money were kept stable GDP would fluctu,ate  less than it does now. In particular, 
Brunner and Meltzer in their more recent thinking allow for the possibility that 
fluctuations in the profitability of investmer~t  account for a significant proportion of GDP fluctuations. All the same, monletarists co~nsider  the private sector more stable than 
Keynesians do. Unfortunately, it has proved extremely difficult to bring empirical 
evidence to bear on this issue. 
Monetarists have devoted considerable effort to explaining various inflations as 
due to an excessive gruwt~l  rate of the money supply, and not to cost-push factors, 
such as union militancy and supply shocks. They stress that a supply shock, such as 
the quadrupling of oil prices by OPEC, can lead only to a temporary blip in the price 
level, and not an ongoing higher rate of inflation - as long as the central bank does not 
accommodate the increased demand for money resulting from the rise in prices. And if 
it does accommodate it, then th!e inflation should be blamed on the central bank. 
It is not surprising that the most dmmatic instance of instability, the Great 
Depression of the 1930s, has drawn much attention. At the time, this depression was 
treated as demonstrating the instability of  the capitalist system, and also as showing 
the unimportance of monetary policy.  Bul in 1963 Friedman and Schwartz published a 
monetary history of the United States from 1867 to 1960 that explained the behavior of 
income and prices by changes in the quantity of money, and offered a radical re- 
interpretation of the Great Depression. They argued that its severity and length resulted 
from the great decline of the quantity of rrlioney that occurred (nominal MI  fell by about 
one quarter), due to the failure of many banks. the public's withdrawal of currency from 
banks, and the desire of banks for a higher reserve ratio. They blamed the  Federal 
Reserve (Fed) for not increasing bank reserves sufficiently to maintain the money 
supply. 
Not only monetarists, but also marly other economists  have found this re- 
interpretation, wholly or in part, persuasive, though it has also drawn  criticism. Thus 
Peter Temin (1937-) argued that the decline in the money supply resulted not from a 
downward shift of the supply curve of molney, but from a downward shift of the demand 
curve for money as income fell., thus raising the familiar issue of reverse causation. 
Friedman and Schwartz have also been c:riiicized for de-emphasizing the influence of 
international factors on the American economy, and for ignoring the effect of bank 
failures on the availability of credit to firms that depended on bank credit. Critics have 
also argued that the Fed should not be bllamed for allowing massive bank failures, 
because many banks were so weakened by the fall in agricultural prices and by bad 
banking practices that even a highly expansionary Fed policy would not have saved them. The debate is still ongoing, but it seems likely that eventually the Friedman- 
Schwartz explanation will be seen as a major part of, but not the entire explanation of 
this episode. 
From Nominal Income to Prices and Real Income 
Macroeccn~.mics  has :r.  .  . .+lain lmore than just ,~ominal  income --  a sustained 5 
percent rise in nominal income denotes a good performance if all of it represents a rise 
in real income, but not if it represents an 8 percent rise in prices and a 3 percent 
decline in real income.  In other words,  one needs to understand the supply side as 
well as the demand side of the macro-economy.  This has proved difficult. There is little 
disagreement about the underlyi~ng  idea that the aggregate supply curve slopes 
upwards, but the nature and slope of this  curve has proved controversial.  A curve, 
called  the  Phillips Curve, afterj4.W. Phillips (1914-75), and shown in Figure 1, relates 
changes in wages or prices to the level of memployment. (Alternative versions linking 
the level of wages and prices to unemployment are not as widely used.)  Ideally, the 
change in wages would be linked to changes in both the supply of and demand for 
labor, but since the demand for l'abor  is hard to measure,  unemployment is used as a 
proxy for the balance of supply a~nd  demand in the labor market.) 
In the 1960s many Keynesians argued that the Phillips curve provides the 
government with a menu of policy choices, allowing it to select its preferred 
combination of  unemployment and inflation rates.  This optimistic view was soon 
discredited.  It was discredited by the facts when in the  1970s both  unemployment 
and inflation rose in the U.S.  More fundamentally, in the late 1960s Edward Phelps 
(1930-) and Friedman challenged the belief that there is a stable and hence usable 
trade-off between inflation and unemployment. They pointed out that economic theory 
tells us that the supply of labor dlepends on real, not nominal wages.  While this basic 
insight cannot be denied, it has been used in different ways by various schools. 
The standard response was to relal:e  the change in wages (and hence implicitly 
also the change in prices)  not just to the  ~.memployment  rate, but also to the expected 
inflation rate.  Suppose that when the public expects zero inflation it takes a 5 percent 
unemployment rate  to keep wage increases equal to the 2 percent rate at which 
productivity is growing,  But if  the public e,~pects,  say  6 percent inflation, then nominal 
wages will rise  by  8 percent whenever  th~e  unemployment rate is 5 percent.  This  8 
percent rise in  nominal wages will then rails@  the inflation rate, which, in turn, will raise 2 3 
the rate of wage increases, so that inflation continually accelerates. There is a certain 
unemployment rate, called the "!natural  rate" by Friedman and the non-accelerating 
inflation rate of unemployment [iNAIRU) by Modigliani,  that keeps the inflation rate 
constant.  Since this unemployn~ent  rate is likely to vary  over time  it has proved hard 
to estimate. But  there is "videspread, though not u- .- -:TOUS,  agreement among 
Keynesians and  traditional monetarists that, while the short-run Phillips curve is like SS 
in Figure 1, so that a short-run inflation-unemployment  trade-off  exists,  the long-run 
curve is vertical. 
Various schools of economics have responded  differently to these findings. 
Post-Keynesians adhere to a low unemployment goal and advocate incomes policy to 
control inflation.  Most mainstream Keyne~~ians  nowadays accept that in the long run 
one cannot  maintain an unemplloyment rate below the  NAIRU, but sometimes argue 
that the long-run is a very long way off, anld at one time seemed to argue that inflation 
expectations would never catch up, so thal: the Phillips  curve wouid never become 
vertical. This is no longer a  widely maintained position. But since, as discussed below, 
Keynesians are generally not as opposed ,I:o inflation as monetarists are, they have 
shown a greater willingness to experiment with running the economy  at low rates of 
unemployment. 
By contrast, monetarists believe that expectations adjust soon enough to limit 
the applicability of the short-run Phillips curve to a time span that is too short to be 
relevant for policy.  Thus  Friedman has suggested that at a time of low inflation there 
was a two year lag between changes in thle growth rate of money and the resulting 
change in the inflation rate. and that this lag  shrinks as the  public becomes more 
aware of inflation. Moreover,  some monetarists have argued that the short-run Phillips 
curve is highly unstable, which provides another reason for not  basing policy on it. 
New classical economists  offer a riadically different interpretation cf the Phillips 
curve. They argue that since exipectations are formed rationally the adoption of an 
inflationary policy will immediatedy raise expectations of  future inflation,  and hence the 
rate of  wage increases, so that even the short-run Phillips curve is vertical when the 
government adopts a visibly  expansionary policy. They therefore interpret the 
observed positive relation between inflaticln and output (which implies a  negative 
relation between inflation and unemployn~ent)  very differently. Instead of  an 
equilibrium in which extra output is  voluntarily supplied in response to inflationary shocks,  causation runs from unexpected inflation to output.  The supply response 
occurs because  suppliers mistake the rise in absolute prices  that they observe for 
their products for a relative price improvement in their product.  But that occurs only if 
the inflation is unexpected and is therefore less likely in countries in which most of the 
observed changes in prices are due to a rise  in the price level rather than to a rise in 
relative prices. 
Keynesians and  monetarists respo17d  that even though the public may  on the 
average predict a change in the inflation rate correctly, institutional rigidities, such as 
long-run wage contracts prevent the immediate adaptation of  money wages, so that in 
the short run the Phillips curve is not completely inelastic.  Terminating an inflation may 
therefore  result in  a  substantial rise in unemployment that may last a considerable 
time. 
Monetary Policy 
Monetarism is as well known for its strong 1)olicy implications as for its ideas about the 
economy's behavior. It is no doubt for this leason that it arouses such strong passions, 
not merely among economists, but in some countries also in the wider political arena. 
Four issues need to be discussed, the gensral outlook of monetarists, their  focus on 
controlling inflation, their  views on the targets and instruments that the central bank 
should use, and their advocacy of  stable monetary growth. 
General Outlook 
Monetarists generally favor free market pollicies.  Thus in the United Kingdom 
monetarism is the doctrine of the Conservative party, while in the U.S. the leading 
monetarist, Milton Friedman, is also a leading opponent of government intervention. 
Monetarists have been among the strongest critics of  various financial regulations, 
such as deposit rate ceilings.  Tliere are several links between the monetarist theory of 
income determination and their preference for  market processes. One is that in this 
theory fluctuations in nominal inlcome are due largely to fluctuations in the money 
supply generated by monetary policy, and not to an inherent instability of the private 
sector that the government needs to offset. Moreover, if the price level is determined by 
the quantity of money rather than by  wage pressures and market power, then another 
reason for certain government intewentiorls, such as price controls, disappears. 
All the same,  the connection between monetarist theory and free market 
economics is not tight, and a socialist could readily accept the quantity theory. Germany  which has followed a much more monetarist policy than the United States 
has a stronger social safety net than the U.S.  Monetary policy has been more 
monetarist in Austria than in Britain, despite Austria having a much larger public sector 
and a corporatist policy.  Moreover, one cam be strong supporter of free markets while 
rejecting monetarism. 
Importance of C:ontrolling Inflation 
Monetarists are more concerned about inflation than are  Keynesians. In part, this is 
due to their focusing more on the long run. It is also due to their belief that it takes less 
time than Keynesians think before we reach the  long run with its vertical Phillips curve; 
they  are less  influenced by a  nnodel  in which prices are slow to adjust than are many 
Keynesians. So they  are reluctant to tolerate inflation to gain a temporary decline in 
unemployment.  Moreover,  since monetar~sts  believe that, given monetary stability, the 
market system can be trusted to deliver wilh reasonable rapidity its normal equilibrium 
of  relative prices and real quantities, moncrtary conditions should be set  primarily with 
the aim of price stability. In addition, while  many Keynesians view the economy as 
operating much of the time at an unemployment rate that is greater than is needed to 
prevent accelerating inflation monetarists cllo not share this view.  Hence they are  less 
willing to accept expansionary policies whenever unemployment rises.  Some 
Keynesians have accused monektarists of giving preference to price stability because 
they have greater social sympathy with the well-to-do who lose more from inflation 
than with the less well-off who lose more from unemployment.  But the previously cited 
reasons suffice to account for monetarists being more concerned about inflation. 
The new classical view is  more equivocal. Since the economy adapts efficiently 
and  rapidly to any predictable monetary policy, predictable inflation does little damage, 
except to induce people to hold too little currency.  But since it does not do any  good, it 
is better to have stable prices. 
Targets and Instruments 
The central bank controls directly bank reserves, short-term interest rates and the 
exchange rate, not GDP or the price level.  The latter variables are far removed from its 
tools, and it needs a  way of translating its wishes about  GDP, etc., into specific 
operating instructions about its tools.  Brurmer and Meltzer (see Brunner and Meker, 
1989)  found in 1964 that the Federal  Reserve had only  vague and often misleading 
ideas about how its open market operations were affecting GDP,  so that it frequently mistook even the direction of  its  effects.  They therefore developed an analytic 
framework of targets and instrurnents  that allows a central bank to see the relation 
between its actions and their effects.  It has the central bank select a target variable, 
such as the  money  supply or  Ilong-term interest rates, that bears a predictable relation 
to its GDP  goal. It then tries to attain the appropriate level of  this target variable by 
manipulating the instrumental variables that it controls directly, such as short-term 
interest rates and bank resewes. This systematization of monetary-policy strategy was 
a major contribution of monetarism, althoulgh it has by now lost out to a strategy (called 
GDP targeting) of using not just a single target variable, but  many  different target 
variables that are related to GDP.  Bennetl McCallum (1935 -), for example, has 
advocated a rule for targeting monetary gr~ixvth  adjusted for velocity changes by means 
of a GDP target. 
In the 1960s and 1970s lhere was (an extensive debate about what  target the 
central bank should use. Monetarists advorxited the money supply, while many 
Keynesians advocated long-term interest rates. though, in principle, a money supply 
target is also consistent with Keynesian theory.  The main issues in this debate were 
the relatedness of the target variable to GDP, its measurability and the extent to which 
the central bank can control it.  If the central bank cannot measure how far away it is 
from its target, or lacks the tools to attain il with sufficient accuracy, then such a target 
is useless. 
The  problems of measuring money and interest rates have already been 
discussed.  The control problem arises because in the short run the relation between 
bank reserves or short-term interest rates md  the money supply is loose, and because 
the effect of changes in short-term rates OI? long-term rates is weak. 
The relatedness issue is more complex. Suppose that at a time when  GDP is 
at the appropriate level the demand for money increases. Unless the central bank 
increases the money supply correspondinqly interest rates  rise and expenditures fall, 
so that  GDP declines.  Hence, if the demand for money changes the central bank 
should follow a policy of stabilizing interest rates by adjusting the money supply 
accordingly. But now consider the case in which expenditure incentives,  say the 
proffiability of investment, rise and the increased expenditures raise interest rates.  In 
this case to keep income constant the certtral bank should let interest rates  rise, and 
not increase the money supply.  If it does increase the money supply  it is destabilizng because it prevents the natural  increase i~ti  interest rates that would act as a an 
automatic stabilizer. The trouble is that the central bank usually does not know  whic4 
of these two cases confront it.  All it obsewes is that interest rates rise, and it has to 
decide whether or not to hold them down t)y increasing the money supply. If it has an 
interest rate target it will automatically  inc~ease  the money supply to keep  the interest 
rate at its target level. If it has a money supply target it will keep the money supply 
constant and let the interest rate rise. 
Since the central bank's tools of open market operations and discount rate 
changes do not directly set the money suplply or the long-term interest rate it needs 
some instruments also called operating ta~gets  that are closer to its tools.  One  such 
instrument is the short-term interest rate. Ilt affects the long-term rate through the term 
structure relationship, and it affects the growth rate of money by influencing the 
quantity of money that the public wants to hold.  Various measures of reserves, such as 
total reserves, borrowed reserves or mbo~  rowed reserves (that is reserves not 
borrowed from the central bank) provide alternative instruments. Monetarists favor the 
use of total reserves because th~at  gives th~e  central bank tighter control over the money 
supply than do the other reserve measurec1;.  For example, if the central bank uses 
unborrowed  reserves then bank  can lncr~ease  their reserves, and hence the money 
supply, by borrowing reserves from it. 
Monetarists advocate not only a money supply target, but also that the central 
banks  keep  the money supply growing at  a stable rate (which might be zero.)  In the 
hard-core version of monetarism  the central bank should keep the money supply  or 
the base growing  each month at a fixed ri3te. Monetarists  offer two main reasons  for 
this. First, they claim that the central bank cannot predict GDP and the effects of its 
actions on GDP sufficiently well to be stabdizing. As Friedman (1953) has shown, a 
countercyclical policy that is right half the illme is actually destabilizing, and the 
forecasting accuracy required to have a significant stabilizing effect is substantial. For 
example,  to reduce the standard deviation of income by one third, the correlation 
between the initial fluctuation in income and the change in income induced by 
countercyclical policy must exceed 0.7, and the policy must be of  optimal size. If it is 
too strong it will destabilize income. Given the long and probably variable lag  between 
changes in monetary policy and the resulllng change in GDP,  countercyclical policy 
may easily do more harm  than good. In addition,  new classical theory supports  the traditional monetarist position by 
emphasizing the possibility of shifting behavioral responses to activist policies. This 
Lucas critique arises from the optimizing nature of behavior which will adjust to new 
constraints set by policymakers.  By showing that it is uncertain what the effects of 
activist policy will be this ?rgumertt reinforces the st~nrfard  monetarist argurnonts about 
the central bank's ignorance. 
The second  reason monetarists give for opposing countercyclical policy is  that 
the central bank lacks the incentive to pursue an effective stabilization policy.  They 
believe that central banks, like otlher govern~ment  agencies do not act to maximize the 
public's welfare, but to maximize the welfare of their political masters or their own 
welfare.  It may, for example, eas,e policy excessively before an election or adopt 
inflationary policies because they raise govc:?rnment  revenues.  Central banks act also 
to maximize their own autonomy, power and prestige. Thus, they may  stabilize the 
short--term interest rate instead of GDP because the public sees them more directly at 
fault if the interest rates they conitrol fluctuate than if GDP, which is also influenced by 
many other factors, fluctuates.  Moreover, since central banks lack sufficient 
accountability they are under insufficient pressure to abandon outworn views.  This 
dispute between monetarists and Keynesiains deals with topics on which economic 
theory and econometric testing pirovide only limited help, and the case the monetarists 
have made is more suggestive than conclusive. 
In the 1980s another arguiment became prominent. This is that the central bank 
has an incentive to fool people  into overestimating the real wage.  If  they believes that 
the  real wage is  higher they will work harder, and thus generate more tax revenue, 
and also unemployment falls.  The  central bank therefore has an incentive to claim that 
it will follow a low-inflation policy, so that the nominal wage that employers offer looks 
like a high real wage. Once people have accepted employment based on their belief in 
a low inflation rate the central bank raises the inflation rate.  What makes this problem 
worse is that people  may exped: the central bank to do this, so that to protect their 
real wage they demand a higher nominal wage. To prevent  this from generating 
unemployment the central bank then has to validate the higher wage demands by 
inflationary policies. The result is  a higher inflation rate and no increased work  or 
reduction in unemployment. However, since this is a sub-optimal outcome the public 
may expect that the central bank will not phy this game, which  then gives the central bank an incentive to do so after all.  Game-theoretic analysis has shown that various 
solutions are possible.  A rule requiring the central bank to pursue  a fwed monetary 
growth rate offer a solution to  th~is  problem 
On the other side, Keynesians have largely ignored the monetarist arguments, 
and proci3sctad as thoh,.  , ..  were all but self-evifent that central banks act almost 
entirely in the public interest. Nor have Keynesians provided compelling evidence that 
central banks can predict sufficiently well fcrr countercyclical policy to be effective. To 
some extent the debate  turns on the creditrility of  large econometric models. 
The strongest Keynesian argument against a constant monetary growth rate 
rule was that velocity may become unstable.  And when the 1980s M-1 velocity, and  in 
the 1990s &  velocity in the U.S.,, did becorlne unstable  (as also happened in the U.K. 
with respect to Mg  and  M4  in the 1980s, an13  to a more modest extent Mo from the late 
1980s)  belief in a fixed monetary growth ra~te  rule in its simple form lost much of its 
appeal. However,  its basic idea has survivt?d  in the form of feedback rules.  These are 
rules that specify not a fixed grovvth rate for  money, but a fixed response of the 
monetary growth rate to economic developments.  Such a rule might specify that the 
monetary base grow at a  rate equal to a I;,!  quarter moving average of real GDP minus 
a  12 quarter moving average of the velocity of the base. Meltzer, a leading monetarist, 
has proposed such a rule, which is similar tc:,  one proposed by McCallum. It meets the 
monetarists' concern that central banks carmot forecast ;;dell  enough and that they 
cannot be trusted, while meeting the Keynesian concern that the growth rates of 
velocity or of potential GDP may vary. 
Monetarism in Practice 
Monetarism has influenced monetary policy in many countries.  Perhaps under the 
influence of monetarism along with the lessons of experience, all G-7 countries have 
brought their inflation rates down below what they were in the early 1970s before the 
first oil shock. To do so many coluntries adopted publicly announced monetary targets 
in the late 1960s and 1970s. But most of them abandoned monetary targeting again in 
the 1980s, when financial innovations, largely connected with computer technology and 
deregulation, caused velocity  to become unstable. 
Yet it can be said that most central banks in industrialized countries  are 
monetarist converts In the sense that they regard monetary conditions as the crucial 
determinant of nominal demand needing to be controlled -  if only the money supply could be  properly measured. The problem has been that of finding reliable measures 
in a  deregulated, global world with rapid technological change. 
Indeed this conversion of central banks is intimately connected  with the 
resurgence of free market ideas that have among other reforms given us this new 
financial world.  Before monetarism it was lashionable for policymakers -  not merely in 
the Anglo-Saxon world of the 1960s, but also in the social democratic countries of 
continental Europe - to see  wage and price controls as a viable instrument for 
controlling inflation. Monetarism, with its faith in the operations of  free markets -  would 
have been favored because it replaced such controls along with their distortions of 
relative prices and their generally debilitating effects on market forces. Thus 
monetarism can be seen  as an important ally of  free market forces generally. 
The experience of three countries,  Germany, the United Kingdom and the U.S. 
deserve particular attention 
German Monetarism 
Germany is the most monetarist among  thle large industrialized countries. One 
characteristic of monetarism,  great concerln about inflation,  has a natural appeal in 
Germany because of its history of hyperinflation. Accordingly, the  Bundesbank is 
legally required to give priority to maintaining the value of the currency, and has 
generally aimed at an inflation rate of  about 2 percent. 
German policy is also monetarist in its (at least so far) continued reliance on 
money supply targeting. The specific measure  it used as a target from 1975 through 
1987 was essentially similar to the moneta~y  base, and since then it has used M3. In 
fifteen of the twenty years, 1975 to 1994,  the Bundesbank succeeded in keeping the 
actual growth of its  targeted  monetary aggregate essentially within its  target range. 
All the same, the Bundesbank had to 'interpret"  the actual growth rate of M3  growth rate 
because  since  1990 it has both1 undershot and overshot its targets significantly. 
It seems plausible to conclude that monetarism has been successful in 
Germany. The inflation rate has been remarkably low, while its  unemployment rate has 
been fairly stable around a rising trend (due to a rising natural rate), which implies that 
its inflation-oriented policy has not been ccrstly. It is therefore not surprising that the 
German experience has influenced  plans for the proposed European central bank. 
Opponents of  monetarism can, of course, argue that the Bundesbank's success has been due to factors other than its monetarist policies, such as the German aversion to 
inflation, and its system of  labor relations. 
American Monetarism 
On October 5, 1979, in response to a high and rising inflation rate that threatened both 
domestic and foreign confidence! in the dollar, the Fed made a dramatic move towards 
monetarism. It put much more emphasis or) lowering the inflation rate, and also gave 
much greater weight to achieving its targets for the growth rate of money. This policy is 
therefore usualty called the "monetarist experiment". Not surprisingly, interest rates and 
interest-rate volatility rose sharply. But very surprisingly, the volatility of the monetary 
growth rate rose instead of falling. 
In the  autumn of 1982 this policy was abandoned, and monetary poky  was 
eased. Although the Fed still anrrounces mlonetary "targets",  these "targets"  play little, if 
any,  role in its policymaking. Similarly, the  Fed again uses short-term interest rates as 
its instrument. But it has by no means returned entirely to its previous policy. It now 
gives substantially greater weight to controllling inflation, and has announced the 
essentially monetarist goal of bringing the inflation rate down to a level where it will no 
longer be an important considera~tion  in the public's planning.  It also recognized that, 
given the lag in the effect of monetary policy, it should tighten as soon as aggregate 
demand threatens to become excessive, even if the inflation rate has not yet risen. 
Moreover, it now realizes the dangers of stabilizing the nominal interest late in the face 
of changing conditions. 
The were several reasons for the ch~ange  of policy.  First,  the unexpected 
decline in MI  velocity had made monetary ~rolicy  much more restrictive than intended. 
Moreover, the instability of velocily now made targeting the money stock much less 
appealing. Other reasons were  the great severiiy of the recession, fear that the 
prevailing high interest rates coulld generate a financial crisis, concern about the effect 
of  the high interest rates on LDC:  debtors, ;and perhaps congressional threats to the 
Fed's independence. 
The Fed did succeed in greatly lowering the inflation rate, though at the cost of 
very high unemployment. But on the tactical level of controlling the money supply it was 
a total failure. Hence Keynesians point to il as demonstrating the infeasibility of 
controlling the money supply and  the ~nre~alism  of the whole monetarist program. 
Monetarists respond by denying that the policy was monetarist, and object to calling it the  "monetarist experiment". They point out that the Fed had not changed its operating 
procedures in the ways they had recommerrded. In particular, instead of using total 
reserves as its instrument the Feld used unl:)orrowed  reserves. Moreover, it applied the 
reserve requirement not to the current level of deposits, but to the deposits in an earlier 
period. Both of these procedures reduced its control over the money supply. Whether 
the failure of the so-called monetarist experiment on the tactical level of  controlling 
short-term money growth should therefore t:)e counted against monetarism is an open 
question,  particularly since  much of  the m!onthly  variability of M, growth originated in a 
mysterious variability of the ratio d  currency to deposits. 
Monetarism in thle United Kingdom 
Monetarism in Britain differs from monetarisim in Germany and in the United States not 
only by the conditions that brought it forth, but also by forming the central part of the 
program of a political party. In Germany  the policies of the Bundesbank have not been 
a major political issue,  and in the! United States monetarism was just one of several 
strands of the Reagan program,  and never received much publicity.  But in Britain it 
was the centerpiece of  the Mrs. Thatcher's program.  The key reason for this was that 
monetarism was seen as an effective free market tool for controlling inflation, whereas 
before incomes policy  was both interventio~nist  and ineffective. 
In 1979 Mrs. Thatcher inhierited a  monetary mess. Inflation was rising rapidly 
from an initial rate of 10 percent. The policy of wage cont~ols  that had been used to 
hold it down in 1978 had crumbled in the "winter of discontent"  of  that year when 
graves went undug and rubbish piled up in the streets. Large public sector difference is 
that in Britain monetary and fiscal policy are! closely linked.  The deficit (together with 
government lending to the private sector) called the Public Sector  Borrowing 
Requirement (PSBR), is financedl by the Balnk of England's purchase of government 
securities, and thus by the creation of  bank, reserves and money.  By contrast, in the 
United States the Fed is not compelled to purchase additional pay increases were 
promised by a commission that the previous government had set up. The budget was in 
crises; already the deficit was up to 5 percent of GDP  and it would clearly rise sharply 
with these pay awards on top of lthe usual spending pressures. The deficit was seen to 
be important in conditioning financial confidence, and until spending was reduced the 
Conservatives could not satisfy tiheir wish to cut taxes. This was the background to the policies pursued. Little importance was attached 
to the operating methods used by the central bank, whether monetary base control or 
interest rate setting in pursuit of monetary targets.  So what with this and the emphasis 
on fiscal policy support, the debate on monletary policy in Britain took a very different 
form fron? ttA  in the U.  'nough it had perha1  s a rather European character. 
For monetary policy the key problem was seen to be the  lack of long-term 
credibility of  the counter-inflation policy.  The previous government had instituted 
monetary targets in 1976 in conjiunction with IMF support for sterling.  It had also 
managed a substantial reduction in the budget deficit; the PSBR fell from 10 percent of 
GDP in 1975 to below 4 percent in 1977. Nevertheless, the policies lacked long-term 
durability. Incomes policy, which lhad been emphasized as the key bulwark against 
inflation crumbled, as it was widely predicted it must in a free economy.  The money 
supply target for f  M3  was eventulally "achieved", but only by imposing a tax on deposits 
that are not included in EMs , while other measures of money, such as Mo  rose 
excessively.  And budgetary disc~~pline  was  based on cuts without any long-term 
strategy for reducing the size of  the public sector; so that they were seen as a 
temporary pain to be reversed owe  the pressure from the IMF  was off. 
Thus,  the problem of a credibly durable monetary restraint on prices was one of 
fundamental political economy, and not merely a technical matter of the central bank 
setting appropriate targets.(See Minford (1995) (1943-) To achieve durability, and it 
was hoped to convince people rapidly of that  durability,  policy was cast  in the form  of 
a Medium Term Financial Strategly or MTFS. This consisted first of a s~mmitment  to a 
five-year rolling target for gradually decelerating f MS+  Second, controls were removed, 
including incomes policy, exchange controls, and the special reserve requirement on 
excessive growth in interest-yieldling deposits. Third, the monetary commitment was 
backed up by parallel reductions in the PSBRIGDP ratio. The MTFS carried the full 
authority of the Prime Minister and notionally of the Cabinet, so that future deviations 
should be seen as a seriously embarrassing  breach of promise to the electorate. On 
the optimistic view that it should be totally credible, market expectations of both short 
and long term inflation should drop, interest rates should fall rapidly, and any recession 
should be short-lived, possibly non-existent, as the falling monetary growth was offset 
by a falling inflation rate, so maintaining real money balances and consumer 
purchasing power. In spite of apparently impeccable logic, the MTFP not only failed to command 
credibility, fully or even to a significant extent. It also failed to be carried out in its own 
literal terms.  Yet policy turned olut to be more fiercely contractionary than the 
gradualism intended; it was closer to shock tactics than gradualism -  a paradoxical 
outcome. The trouble came from1 two directions: technical design and politics. 
Technically, the choice of EM3 mas an error, because after deregulation of  the banks 
(including off-shore ones with nab  exchange controls) high-interest rate deposits became 
the major weapon in the banks'  battle for market share. As the banks' fortunes ebbed 
and flowed, so did EM3.  In 1980-81 EM3 overshot its target massively. Yet M,  was 
unaffected by deregulation and told a quite! different story of sharply tightening 
monetary conditions. Its growth rate halved in the twelve months to mid 1980 and 
halved again in the next twelve. It is obvious from the behavior of the economy which 
story is the true one; the sharp recession in 1980-81, the rapid fall in inflation and the 
strong exchange rate, all confirm Mo  as  the accurate indicator. M4,  a broader aggregate 
than EM3  , roughly equivalent to U.S. M3  ,  also supports M,  for this period when the 
main intermediary competition was between the banks and the building societies 
(equivalent to U.S. savings and loans) whose deposits are included in Mq. Naturally, 
with hindsight enthusiasts for broad money redefined it in  terms of M,,,  but too late (and 
who could tell when the next twi:jt of intermediary competition would destabilize M4  in 
turn?) 
Politically, the pain of recession, especially in the manufacturing sector, 
undermined the already insecure position of the monetarists in the Conservative party, 
and Mrs. Thatcher faced substantial internal opposition. The days of the MTFS and 
perhaps even of Mrs. Thatcher herself  seemed numbered. 
So the MTFS was widely written offf at  this time as a failure because its targets 
had not been achieved. and as ,a temporary interlude before traditional politics 
returned. 
In early 1981 the technical problerns concerning M3  began to be  appreciated 
largely due to  the arrival in Britain and  Downing Street of  Sir Alan Walters.  The 
decision was  taken to loosen monetary policy in order to weaken the exchange rate, to 
stabilize M,  at a growth rate around 5 percent, and to permit output to recover. To 
enhance credibility, the budget (of  1981 increased taxes by 2 percent of GDP to cut the 
PSBR even though the recession still had not ended. This cut was crucial in finally creating  market confidence in the policies" durability. Long-term interest rates which 
had fluctuated around 14 percent for two years began to fall at last. Output also started 
to recover. The policy emphasis thus switched towards fiscal and away from monetary 
tightness. But overall policy remained extremely tight throughout. 
Policies close to shock ia~ctics  were implzmented by these means, perhaps 
mainly by accident, but to some degree surely by intuitive survival instinct: that is given 
that recession was connected in popular debate with the monetarist policies, it was vital 
to get results on inflation in shorlt order as justification. In the end, the rapid fall in 
inflation -- down to 5 percent by end-1982  restored the fortunes of Mrs.  Thatcher and 
her supporters. 
Evaluation 
As the century draws to a1  close a criiic of monetarism  might say that it is  in a 
crisis. Given the disappearance of a stable demand function  for money  and stable 
velocity, monetarism provides ncl reliable way of predicting GDP. And this is serious for 
a theory that puts its emphasis on practicality rather than on elegance. But one should 
avoid overemphasizing this problem. The quantity theory can still predict fairly 
accurately by how much an increbase in the money supply will raise income. Moreover, it 
is possible that velocity will again become predictable, either due to institutional 
changes or to more sophisticated econometric techniques. 
A second problem is that while monetarists have raised cogent questions about 
the ability and good intentions of central banks,  they have not really established tha~t 
countercyclical monetary policy cannot suclceed.  But what they have done is to raise a 
question that is difficutt for their opponent tlo answer: what evidence is there that 
stabilization policy  actually stabilizes rather destabilizes the economy? 
The third problem for monetarists is internal to the economics profession. Thle 
simple, empiricallyuriented theo~ry  that monetarism represents, has now lost populariiy 
as the economics profession has been caught up in the intellectual excitement of new 
classical theory. Perhaps for this reason relatively few young economists are 
monetarists, and economists are now much less occupied than [previously with 
debating monetarism. 
But that is much too gloomy a picture. To a considerable extent  monetarism is 
the victim of its own success; some of its basic ideas have become so widely accepted 
that they  are now no longer labeled monetarist. Keynesians have moved substantially in the monetarist direction. They now consider the money supply and monetary policy 
much more important than they did in the 1!350s. Many, probably most Keynesians 
accept that the Phillips curve is vertical in th~e  long run, and have ceased to treat the 
long run as a never-never land.  A major  growth point of  Keynesian theory, New 
Keynesian theory,  that defends the price si.ickint?ss  proposition of both Keynesians 
and monetarists,  might just as well be called New  Monetarist as New Keynesian. New 
classical theory is essentially monetarist thelory minus  the  proposition of price 
stickiness. 
There is also considerable support for making price stability the central goal of 
monetary policy,  though this is d~ue  in part lo  the development of time-inconsistency 
theory, which is more closely associated with the work of new classical than with 
monetarist economists. But that i:;  essentially an accident of  history: substantively time- 
inconsistency theory fits in as well with monetarism as with new classical theory. 
Moreover, while the instability of velocity has greatly reduced  support for a fixed 
monetary growth rate,  its basic idea lives oln in proposals for  feedback rules. 
To be sure, one might argue that  the changed way economists think about 
monetary policy are due more to the pressure of brute facts than to the teachings of 
monetarists, but if this is the case, then monetarists should be credited with having 
seen important truths ahead of others. Monletarism as a distinct school is in decline, but 
monetarist ideas are flourishing. REFERENCES 
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